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Corporate governance models 
ü  United States 
ü  Great Britain 
ü Germany 
ü Japan 
ü Continental European countries 
Mkt 
oriented 
(arm’s length 
based) 
Bank 
Oriented 
(relationship- 
based) 
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Corporate governance models 
Typical form of control	
 Shareholders	

US, UK	
 Public company	
 Small shareholders	

Institutional	

investors	

Germany	
 Large shareholder	
 Banks (big comp.), Family (small comp.)	

Japan	
 Keiretsu	

Cross-ownership	

Banks	

Italy, 
France	

Majority shareholder	
 Families or 
government	

China	
 State-Owned firm	
 Government and 
other Government-
owned entities	

Prof. Marco Bigelli  - University of Bologna 
US and UK 
ü Managers own only 2-3% of company shares 
ü Mutual and pension funds “vote with their feet” 
ü Focus on mkt price and short-term results 
ü Mkt myopia (Stein JPE ’88; QJE ‘89) 
ü Lower R&D expenses 
ü Agency costs of separation of ownership from 
control. Management versus shareholders 
Public company 
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Examples of extravagant private benefits 
Adelphia Communications 
In the 2004 Adelphia securities fraud trial, prosecutors alleged that founding CEO John 
Rigas twice requisitioned company aircraft to deliver a Christmas tree to his daughter (the 
second flight became necessary after the first tree was rejected as unsuitable), while 
Rigas’s son Timothy, the company’s chief financial officer, repeatedly made company 
planes available to Australian actress-model Peta Wilson in a futile attempt to ‘‘impress’’ 
her (Yermack, JFE, 2006) 
 
RJR – Nabisco 
Burrough and Helyar (Barbarians at the Gate, 1990, pp. 93-94) provide an account of 
managers’ aircraft use at RJR-Nabisco, which before its 1991 leveraged buyout 
maintained an ‘‘RJR Air Force’’ of ten aircraft. The planes were flown by a squad of 36 
company pilots, housed in ‘‘the Taj Mahal of corporate hangars,’’ and made available for 
use by CEO F. Ross Johnson to a range of friends, celebrities, golf instructors, and family 
pets (one of whom was listed on a passenger manifest as ‘‘G. Shepherd’’). The authors 
write that ‘‘the jets were a symbol of the increasingly fuzzy line between what constituted 
proper use of a corporate asset and what constituted abuse’’ (Yermack, JFE, 2006). 
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Executives’ extravagance 
Rjr Nabisco Ceo and  Director  speech from the movie 
“Barbarians at the gate” 
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Agency costs and alignment of interests 
alignment of interests (JM, 76)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
alfa
Q
Managers own 
100% 
The higher is the managers’ ownership the higher is the 
alignment of interests between shareholders and 
managers 
Hence, JM expects a linear relationship between 
managerial ownerhip (alfa) and firm’s performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q) 
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Internal and external solutions for 
reducing agency costs from O/C separation 
â Agency costs => á efficiency 
ü  mkt for products 
ü  mkt for managers 
ü  mkt for corporate control 
ü  Board of directors 
ü  Debt and Agency costs from FCF 
ü  Incentive schemes 
ü Active institutional investors 
External 
Solutions 
Internal 
Solutions 
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Market for products and 
Market for managers 
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ü  Inefficient companies will progressively have a 
lower market share and will eventually be out of the 
market (Hart,83) 
ü  Even when it works, its action comes too late, 
when all wealth has been destroyed and efficiency 
can’t be restored 
ü It does not work in case of monopolies  
ü Italian Ferrovie dello Stato or Rai 
ü It does not work in close economies 
Mkt for products 
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ü Mkt for managers (Alchian Demsetz, AER ‘72) 
 Fama (‘80): managers have reputational capital 
ü  efficient mkts => bad performance => lower stock price  
ü  Active board  in removing bad managers (needed internal 
competition, non-executive directors, etc.) 
  
Bad managers removed  
•  No easy to remove high managers	

•  The higher the position the older the age (reputation effect less important)	

• Board not enough active	

Mkt for managers 
Actually, this force is not too effective as: 
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Market for Corporate Control 
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Mkt for corporate control 
ü  Manne ( JPE ‘65), Jensen Ruback (JFE ‘83) 
ü  public company 
ü  efficient mrkets  
  
Agency costs => Price down 
M&A 80s (Jensen, 93): 
 $ 2.6 trillion 
 Avg premium paid: 41% 
 750 billion $ value creation 
 
 
 
 
 
MSV(89): Low 
performance 
(active board . or 
M&A) 
 poison pills, antitakeover laws 
Case: RJR 
Nabisco 
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“Greed is good “and helped saving the  
Corporate America” 
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Entrenchment theory 
ü  The threat of a takeover may induce managers to be 
more efficient not to risk to be taken over and 
removed 
ü For higher values of managerial ownership 
managers become more entrenched and difficult to be 
removed (for alfa > 25%, hostile takeovers were 
never successful). The relationship between firm’s 
efficiency and managerial ownership may not be 
monotonic (Fama & Jensen, 1983) since: 
ü Agency costs depend on two forces: 
ü Alignment of interests 
ü Managerial entrenchment 
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First empirical study: Morck, Schleifer, Vishny (JFE,88)	

Empirical evidence on firm’s 
performance and managerial ownership  
However, is ownership structure to influence 
performance or the reverse?	
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Internal solutions to agency problems 
for public companies 
 
Board of directors 
The debt’s discipline 
Incentive schemes 
Monitoring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Prof. Marco Bigelli  - University of Bologna 
 
 
 
The board of directors 
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Internal solution: effective functioning of 
the board of directors 
ü A good corporate governance model should remove 
bad managers? 
ü Empirical studies on executive turnover and performance: 
ü Weisbach (JFE ’88): last decile 6% probability to be removed 
ü Jensen-Murphy (JPE’90),  
ü Volpin (JFE ’02) 
ü Few significant evidence on boards: only a negative 
relation between board size and firm performance 
ü Does the board monitor managers? 
ü Often CEO = Chairman 
ü CEO appoints directors and make the discussion list 
ü Most directors are not independent 
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Two tiered boards in some countries 
ü Two tiered board:  
ü A managing board 
ü A supervisory board (in Germany, a representation of 
employees is mandatory) 
ü A two-tiered board is mandatory in some countries: 
Germany, Austria 
ü A two-tiered board is optional in other countries: 
France, Finland and Italy (from 2004) 
ü In Italian listed companies such structure has been 
adopted especially in banks after major mergers (for 
ex., Intesa-SanPaolo,Unicredit-HVB) 
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Boards and Codes of best practice 
ü Comply or explain rule 
ü They usually regulate:  
ü Board composition and roles: 
ü Definition of executive, non executive and independent director 
ü Lead independent directors and at least 1 meeting with only 
independent directors alone in the Italian Code 
ü Chairman different from CEO 
ü Full disclosure on related party transactions 
ü Internal control system 
ü How directors and auditors should be nominated 
ü Internal committees 
ü i.e. Remuneration committee (staffed with outside directors) 
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FCF hypothesis 
(Jensen, AER86) 
Managers “waste money” when high 
FCF and few profitable investment 
opportunities (mature industries) 
LBOs 
Value creation through minimization of 
agency costs through debt and more 
optimal contracts 
DEBT and Free Cash Flows 
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Incentive schemes 
ü Stock options 
ü EVA  
ü EVA = (R-WACC) Invested Capital 
ü Bonuses on accounting measures 
ü Few incentives in the past: 
ü In US +1000 of value creation = +2.59 in the CEO’s  pocket 
(Jensen-Murphy ’90) 
ü Mean CEO stake = 0,66% 
ü Growing sensitivity of executive pay to performance 
ü In 1994 2 to 10 times higher than in 1980 
ü Stock option fastest growing component 
ü Murphy ’99 Core-Guay-Larcher (RFE ‘01) 
ü Self dealing and high pays also when stock prices 
plummeted (“reward for failure”) 
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CEO PAY 
Ratio of average CEO total pay ( including
options valuated at grant-date)  to average
annual earnings of production workers
Ratio of average CEO’s salary and bonus
To average annual earnings of 
production workers
Dow Jones
Industrials average
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Stock options 
ü Strike price 
ü Mostly at the money 
ü Vesting period: 2-3 year 
ü During such period stock options cannot be 
either sold or exercised 
ü It increases managers’ loyalty to the firm 
ü Stock options allow to save costs and cash 
ü Better economic margins and EPS 
ü Greatly used by .com firms 
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Stock options: shortcomes 
ü High gains no losses 
ü Manager become risk lover 
ü Wrong premia! 
ü Always gain in a bullish stock market never 
in a bearish one! 
ü Stock mkt and industry performance should 
be taken out, by accordingly modifying the 
strike price 
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Stock options: shortcomes 
ü Earnings illusion 
ü Future EPS dilution if stock is issued below mkt 
price 
ü In US they now must be considered as a cost to 
the firm 
ü Fraudolent behaviour 
ü Do whatever possible to keep stock price up till 
the end of the vesting period (Enron) 
ü Bribe analysts 
ü Bribe auditors 
ü “Cook the books” 
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Cook the books 
Definition = Financial statements’ falsification	

	
Reasons to cook the books:	

	

•  Meet shareholders’ expectations	

•  Attract investors	

•  Maintain stock value	

•  Raise debt	

•  Executives’ remunerations based on earnings or stock options	
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Stock options and fraudolent behaviour 
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Enron and insiders’ sales before the 
crash 
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 Excessive compensation 
•  Excessive compensation 
and benefits	

•  Especially for banks 
and financial 
institutions bailed out 
with citizen’s money	
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 A recent case: Richard Fuld 
•  Starts his career in Lehman in 
1969 as an intern…	

•  …25 years later, in 1994, he 
becomes CEO	

•  From 1994 to 2007, he is 
reported to have received nearly 
$500 mln in total compensation	

	

• In December 2008, Fuld was given the "Lex Overpaid 
CEO" and "thief" award of the Financial Times for 
having  received $34m in 2007 and $40.5m in 2006, the 
last two years before his bank's failure.	
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Lehman compensation pushed 
Fuld to take risky decisions 
30,4x 	

vs. 15x	

in commercial 
banks	
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Richard Fuld vs. US House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform 
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Monitoring and active investors 
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Monitoring and active investors 
ü Free riding 
ü Leland-Pyle (JF ’77) Grossman-Hart (BJE ‘80) 
ü Delegated Monitoring  
ü Banks (Diamond, RES ’84),  
ü Stakeholders (Schleifer and Vishny, JPE ‘86) 
ü Monitoring and institutional investors 
ü Vote with their feet 
ü More activism needed (Jensen JF ’93) 
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Hermes UK Focus Fund Investment Process 
 
Becht, Mayer, Franks and Rossi,  RFS 2010 
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Hermes UK Focus Fund Engagement Process 
 
Becht, Mayer, Franks and Rossi, RFS 2010 
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Separation of ownership and control 
through legal devices: 
a European comparison 
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Piramidal group 
Non voting shares 
Contemporary allow 
 Cash flow 
dilution Safe control 
 + 
Majority 
shareholder	

Apparently no agency 
conflict as ownership not 
separated from control 
Actually, it happens that …	

Concentrated ownership and agency 
conflict 
Shareholders 
agreements 
 + 
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Piramidal group and non-voting shares 
Family or completely owned unlisted holding company 
 
 
50%  
voting shares 
 
 
 
50%  
non-voting 
shares 
 
 
 
 
50%  
vot. shares 
 
 
 
50%  
non-vot. 
shares 
 
 
 
 
50%  
vot. shares 
 
 
 
50%  
n-v shares 
 
 
CompanyA 
Company B 
Company C 
50% A’s voting shares 
50% B’s voting shares 
50% C’s voting shares 
OWN = 50% · 50% = 25% 
OWN = 25% · 50% · 50% = 6.25% 
OWN = 6.25% · 50% · 50% = 
1.5625% 
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Piramidal group and non-voting shares 
Family or completely owned unlisted holding company 
 
 
50%  
voting shares 
 
 
 
50%  
non-voting 
shares 
 
 
 
 
50%  
vot. shares 
 
 
 
50%  
non-vot. 
shares 
 
 
 
 
50%  
vot. shares 
 
 
 
50%  
n-v shares 
 
 
CompanyA 
Company B 
Company C 
50% A’s voting shares 
50% B’s voting shares 
50% C’s voting shares 
O/C = 25%/50%= 0.5 
O/C= 6.25%/50%= 0.125 
O/C = 1.5625%/50%=0.03125 
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Pirelli-Telecom piramidal group before 
reorganization 
 
 Marco 
Tronchetti 
Provera 
GPI 
CAMFIN 
PIRELLI 
& C. 
PIRELLI & C. 
Lux. 
PIRELLI 
OLIMPIA 
OLIVETTI 
TELECOM 
TIM FINSIEL TELECOM 
I. LAB 
SEAT 
P. G. 
UNICRED
ITO 
INTESA 
BCI 
EDIZIONE 
HOLDING 
HOPA 8.4% 
8.4% 16.8%
% 
16%
% 
27.5%
% 
50.4%
% 
28.7%
%% 
60% 
55% 
29.6% (56.5%*) 
100% 
100% 58.5%
% 
97.5% 55.1% 
55% 
PIRELLI 
Real Estate 
CAM 
Tecnologie 
Pirelli Cavi 
Energia 
Pirelli Tyres 
61.19% 
Pirelli Cavi 
Telecom 
10.85%
% 
81% 
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Fiat group and separation of 
ownership and control 
Firm
Voting /
Total capital
(%)
Voting Rights
(%)
-CONTROL-
Cash Flow
Rights (%)
-OWN-
Cash Flow/
Voting Rights
-O/C-
Ifi 50.00 82.45 41.23 0.50
Ifil 54.60 52.24 11.76 0.23
Unicem 59.15 47.66 9.04 0.19
Cem. Di Barletta 89.92 47.64 6.78 0.14
Cem. Di Augusta 100.00 47.64 6.22 0.13
Fiat 66.73 28.17 6.12 0.22
Comau 100.00 28.17 4.25 0.15
La Rinascente 72.56 40.51 3.86 0.10
Magneti Marelli 98.50 28.17 3.61 0.13
Ipi 100.00 28.17 3.13 0.11
Snia Bpd 89.72 28.17 2.68 0.10
Snia Fibre 100.00 28.17 2.24 0.08
Toro Assicurazioni 53.12 28.17 2.03 0.07
Sorin Biomedica 100.00 28.17 2.01 0.07
Impreglio 97.81 24.41 1.46 0.06
Gemina 96.14 23.05 1.36 0.06
Caffaro 82.16 28.17 1.32 0.05
Cartiere Burgo 99.02 20.97 0.28 0.01
O/C – Ownership/Control 
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Separation of ownership and control in 
Europe 
Paese #  
companies 
Avg Standard 
deviation 
Median 1° 
quartile 
3°  
quartile 
Austria 95 0.851 0.224 1.000 0.704 1.000 
Belgium 120 0.779 0.360 1.000 0.596 1.000 
Finland 119 0.842 0.246 1.000 0.800 1.000 
France 604 0.930 0.189 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Germany 690 0.842 0.267 1.000 0.709 1.000 
Ireland 68 0.811 0.321 1.000 0.683 1.000 
Italy 204 0.743 0.337 0.971 0.548 1.000 
Norway 149 0.776 0.341 1.000 0.532 1.000 
Portugal 86 0.924 0.218 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Spain 610 0.941 0.178 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sweden 244 0.790 0.339 1.000 0.526 1.000 
Switzerland 189 0.740 0.290 0.830 0.468 1.000 
UK  1,628 0.888 0.228 1.000 0.907 1.000 
Total 4,806 0.868 0.255 1.000 0.852 1.000 
 
Ownership/control ratio for 4806 listed companies 
in 13 EU countries	

Faccio-Lang JFE 2002	
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Separation of ownership and control 
through legal devices: Italian archetype 
	

	

Fonte:  Faccio/Lang,  JFE 
2002	

Prof. Marco Bigelli  - University of Bologna 
Own/Control separation trhough 
legal devices: major effects 
ü Private benefits and perquisites 
ü Overinvestment 
ü Total Insiders participation to SEOs 
ü High voting premium 
ü Particular executive turnover 
ü Minority shareholder expropriation through: 
ü Related party transactions 
ü Inter-group acquisitions 
ü Mergers 
ü Dual class reunification 
ü “Ad-hoc” Stock option plans 
